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Abstract— The paper models the strategic behavior of traders, 
GenCos and ISO using the multi-leader-follower framework. The 
outcomes of the strategic behavior of the players have been 
modeled using an equilibrium problem with equilibrium 
constraints. From a policy perspective it is seen that allowing the 
GenCos to hold FTRs may be welfare enhancing under certain 
demand conditions and ownership patterns of transmission rights 
and generation assets. The proposed model has been simulated 
on a 3 bus system. 
 
Index Terms— Strategic behavior, multi-leader-follower 
games, Cournot conjectures, transmission rights, Equilibrium 
Problem with Equilibrium Constraints. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
N the electricity markets where generators sell power to 
the grid at the market prices of their nodes, arbitragers and 
marketers can eliminate price differences between nodes 
[1]. However, Borenstein et al [2] show that traders’ markets 
may not be competitive. The number of trading firms is 
limited because of the information asymmetry about the 
trading opportunities or certain legal and institutional barriers 
that govern the market. This provides market power to the 
traders and results in an imperfectly competitive market. 
Hence, in such markets, traders cannot be expected to trade to 
a point where the marginal trade breaks even. In a market with 
oligopolistic traders and generation companies (GenCos), 
each market participant makes strategic decision about its own 
price and output after considering the reactions of other 
players. The nature of such reaction depends on the 
conjectures that each player holds about the rival players. 
A mathematical model is developed in this paper to 
formulate the equilibrium problem in the imperfect market 
with traders and GenCos. The model consists of two stages. 
We assume that, at each stage, all previous stage actions are 
observable to the players who base their current decisions on 
that information and on their rational expectation about the 
behaviors of all other players in the current stage and 
subsequent stage outcomes. The conjectural scheme regarding 
the GenCos’ and traders’ strategic behaviors is shown in Fig. 
1. 
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Fig. 1. GenCos and Traders anticipate the impacts of their decisions on net 
injections  
The intent in this and related papers is not to predict 
whether or not market power would be exercised by any 
company. Rather, the analysis of the results is aimed at 
simulating conditions which might allow a GenCo to exercise 
market power in an imperfect market with oligopolistic traders 
and GenCos, as well as analyzing its impact on consumer 
surplus. Following [3]-[6], in this paper, we ignore price 
uncertainties and focus on the effects of the auction of 
transmission rights on equilibrium prices and quantities under 
different market structures, ownership patterns and conjectural 
assumptions, and hence on the market power of GenCos and 
consumer surplus. 
In the literature on modeling strategic behavior in 
electricity networks, alternative representations have been 
used to model the conjectures of competing players. EPECs 
have been particularly used in game theoretic models of 
electricity markets over a network of generators and 
consumers [7]-[10]. EPECs arise when players face utility 
maximization problems in the form of MPECs [11]. MPECs 
have non-convex constraints and may have multiple local 
maxima. Thus EPECs may not have any (pure strategy) Nash 
equilibria in some instances [12]. Early algorithmic works on 
EPECs have focused on diagonalization techniques such as 
Gauss-Jacobi and Gauss-Seidel type methods. Such methods 
solve a cyclic sequence of MPECs, until the decision variable 
of all the MPECs reaches a fixed point. Sequential Nonlinear 
complementarity approach for solving EPEC has also been 
proposed [13]. In [14], Leyffer and Munson derive the 
nonlinear programming (NLP) formulation of the EPEC. The 
same has been used in [15] also. We use the approach 
suggested by Leyffer and Munson [14] to solve the EPEC 
problem for Nash-Cournot equilibrium in this paper. 
The paper is organized as follows. The proposed model is 
formulated in Section II. In section III, the model is applied to 
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a three-bus system. The simulation results are discussed. 
Section IV concludes. 
II.  PROBLEM FORMULATION 
We illustrate the impacts of FTRs on market power of 
GenCos in the networks with loop power flows. 
A.  The ISO’s Problem 
In either of these games, players move sequentially. In 
stage 2, the ISO auctions transmission rights to those who 
value them the most. The value of the transmission right 
between a pair of nodes is defined in terms of the difference in 
nodal prices between the nodes. The price pi at node i is given 
by the inverse demand function of the node, as shown in (1). 
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Power injections at all nodes are decided by the ISO in 
such a manner that the auctioned FTRs are simultaneously 
feasible. Following [16], we have defined net injections in 
terms of balanced point to point FTRs. Net injection at all 
nodes and therefore FTRs auctioned are the decision variables 
of the ISO. Given the nature of the inverse demand functions 
at all nodes, the directions of FTRs and volumes auctioned by 
the ISO can alter nodal energy prices. The value that a trader 
attaches to the FTR between a pair of nodes is defined in 
terms of the product of its bid parameter (ktl) and the 
difference of nodal prices [8]. Likewise, the GenCo may also 
wish to bid FTR, with a bid parameter kgenf,lgen. Therefore, to 
auction FTRs to those, who value them the most, the ISO 
maximizes the following 
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where, pi is the price defined in (1), Bi,j is the susceptance of 
the line between nodes i and j, θi is voltage angle at node i, 
Tmaxij is the maximum transmission capacity of transmission 
line between nodes i and j, FTRmaxtl and FTRmintl are maximum 
and minimum values of FTR l bid by trader t, and 
FTRGENmaxtlgen and FTRGENmintlgen are the maximum and 
minimum values of FTR lgen bid by GenCo f. 
The objective function (2) maximizes the product of the 
bidding parameters, FTR (MW) and the price difference 
between source and sink nodes for all new FTRs being sought 
by all the traders and all the GenCos. Equation (3) is the 
power balance constraint1 at each node i using DC load flow 
                                                          
1 Similar formulation albeit in a different context has been done by Gribik and 
Shirmohammadi [17] 
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and defines power injections in terms of new FTRs auctioned 
to traders and GenCos and pre-committed old FTRs. 
Constraints (4) and (5) are transmission line capacity 
constraints. Inequalities (6) and (8), and (7) and (9) are 
constraints on the maximum and minimum values of the FTRs 
proposed to be purchased by traders and GenCos, 
respectively. All new FTRs auctioned are non-negative (10). 
The consumer at any node cannot self generate and hence, the 
demand at each node is constrained to be non-negative by 
(11). The dual multipliers of the constraints in the proposed 
optimization problem are represented by the symbols, λi, μijmax, 
μijmin, αtlmax, αtlmin, αgf,lgenmax, αf,lgenmin and γi . These are assumed 
to be the same for all the leaders as the ISO cannot price 
discriminate. 
The ISO’s optimization problem stated in (2)-(11) is 
parameterized in the level of generation (xfi) by each GenCo 
f’s generator at node i, the bid parameters of GenCos 
(kgenf,lgen), and the bid parameters of the traders (ktl).  
B.  GenCo’s problem 
The optimization problem for each GenCo f is formulated 
as 
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where, 
pi is the price defined as in (1) 
mcfi is the marginal cost 
fGEN denotes the set of all generators owned by GenCo f 
CAP
fix is the maximum generation capacity of generator i 
fiρ is the dual multiplier of the capacity constraint 
Equations (14) and (15) are respectively the constraints on 
the maximum and minimum values of the strategic bid 
variable (kgenf,lgen) of each FTR lgen sought by GenCo f. 
δgmaxf,lgen  and δgmaxf,lgen are the dual variables attached to these 
constraints, respectively. 
C.  Trader’s problem 
The FTRs held by traders are defined in terms of the power 
delivery at node j and receipt at node i, as a specified amount 
of FTR (in MW) and a per MW price. Transmission rights 
considered here are akin to the prepaid forward contracts (or a 
call option with zero strike price), which are worth as much as 
or less than the underlying assets [18]. They are financial 
instruments issued by the ISO that entitle the transmission 
right holders to be reimbursed from the congestion charges 
collected by the ISO. The congestion charges are calculated in 
terms of the differences of prices at the sink and the source 
nodes. We ignore the risk due to the volatility in the difference 
in nodal prices. The same has been examined in [19]. Since 
the aim of the paper is to discuss the relationship between 
FTR auction and market power of GenCos, we concentrate on 
that issue alone following [3]-[6]. However, inclusion of risk 
and the impact of system contingencies in the model of traders 
and GenCos are intended to be taken up in the further research 
by the authors. Each FTR bidder assumes that the FTRs 
auctioned to it will be influenced by the FTRs auctioned to its 
rivals by the ISO in stage 2 under both the conjectural 
assumptions. The trader needs to decide bidding parameter, kt,l 
accordingly to maximize profits from holding FTRs. The 
trader does this by appending the KKT conditions of the 
ISO’s problem (2)-(11) to its own problem given by (16) – 
(18). Each trader will take the strategic bid parameters (kt,l) of 
its rivals as given (conjectures about rival FTR bidders’ price 
bids have been considered in [19]). Also, it is assumed that 
different traders bid for FTRs between different/same pair of 
nodes. 
Each trader chooses strategic bid parameter kt,l which 
maximizes the total profit (16) from all the FTRs proposed to 
be held by the trader between pre-decided pair of nodes 
(between the nodes of its interest). Hence the optimization 
problem for each trader t to optimize all FTRs held by it is 
formulated as 
,
, ,(1 ) ( ( , , ) ( , , )) )
t l
t t l t l ik l i
Max Z k FTR W t l i U t l i p= − × − ×∑ ∑  (16) 
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, , ,0 , ( )
min min
t l t l t lk k l δ− ≥ ∀  (18) 
where, pi is the price defined as in (1). 
Equations (17) and (18) are respectively the constraints on 
the maximum and minimum values of the strategic bid 
variable (kt,l) of each FTR l sought by trader t. δmaxt,l  and δmint,l 
are the dual variables attached to these constraints 
respectively. 
The effect of traders submitting FTR bids as in above 
model is that the amount of power transmitted between nodes 
is determined by the aggregated bids finally auctioned by the 
ISO in stage 2. Since generators sell electricity at their nodes 
only, the power flow depends on the existing FTRs and the 
new FTRs auctioned. This is reflected in equation (3). 
D.  Solution Method 
Scheme under conjecture assumption shown in Fig. 1, is a 
multi-leader, one follower game. The leaders are not only the 
GenCos but also the traders. All the GenCos and traders 
compete with each other in a Nash-Cournot manner.  
Under this conjecture assumption, each leader, GenCo 
((12)-(15)) and trader ((16)-(18)) takes the first order Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the ISO’s problem, (2)-
(11), as constraints in their optimization problems. Each 
leader therefore solves a Mathematical Problem with 
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). The first-order conditions 
for this generalized Nash Game are non-square in this case, 
because some multipliers cannot be matched to constraints. 
 4
We assume that the multipliers on identical joint constraints 
are the same, that is, the shadow prices are set by the ISO that 
cannot price discriminate. Equilibrium between all the leaders 
can be obtained by solving all the MPECs for all the leaders 
simultaneously. This leads to the formulation of an 
Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC). 
Following Leyffer and Munson [14], we move all the 
complementarity conditions of this EPEC into the objective 
via the penalty approach and transform the problem into a 
nonlinear programming problem (NLP). Further, the Theorem 
3.1 in [14] states that if a local solution is found to this NLP 
with the objective function value equal to zero, then the values 
of the decision variables of both the upper and lower level 
problems represent a strongly stationary point of the multi-
leader-follower game. In all our simulations we have 
considered solutions with the objective function values less 
than 10-15. The simulations were done in GAMS [20] using 
CONOPT-3 solver. 
III.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLES AND DISCUSSIONS 
Three numerical examples are presented in this section to 
illustrate the applications of the proposed models. In each one 
of the numerical examples, the results and discussions are 
presented for three cases.  
Case I: All traders and GenCos compete strategically. Each 
of them maximizes its own profit.  
Case II: All traders collude and maximize their joint profit; 
all GenCos also collude and maximize their joint 
profit.  
Case III: All GenCos and Traders collude and maximize the 
joint profit.  
The examples have been analyzed to study the impacts of 
ownerships of FTRs by GenCos under alternative ownership 
patterns, demand conditions and conjecture assumptions on 
consumer surplus. This is important for design of regulatory 
policy, such as the one that restricts GenCos from possessing 
FTRs. 
A.  Example A  
A three node network (i=1,2,3) as shown in Fig. 2. Two 
generators owned by different GenCos (f=1,2) are located at 
node 1 and node 2, respectively. In this example, assume that 
three traders (t=1,2,3) and two GenCos participate in the FTR 
and power markets. Each trader bids for one FTR between 
different nodes. The FTRs (l=1,2,3) are FTR 1 (from node 1 
to 3), FTR 2 (from node 2 to 3) and FTR 3 (from node 2 to 1). 
Trader 1, Trader 2 and Trader 3 bid for FTR 1, FTR 2, and 
FTR 3, respectively, as shown in Fig. 2. The GenCos also bid 
for FTRs to serve the energy requirements at their nodes. 
GenCo 1 bids for FTR directed from node 3 to node 1 
(FTRGEN 1) and GenCo 2 bids for FTR directed from node 1 
to node 2 (FTRGEN 2). 
1 2 GenCo 1 
GenCo 2 
Trader 3, FTR3 
3 
Trader 1, FTR1 Trader 2, FTR2 
GenCo 1, 
FTRGEN 1 
GenCo 2, FTRGEN 2 
 
Fig. 2. Example A - three node system 
The inverse demand functions of nodes 1, 2 and 3 are:  
p1 = 0.20 – 0.008*q1 
p2 = 0.15 – 0.007*q2 
p3 = 0.20 – 0.08*q3 
where, (p1, q1), (p2, q2), (p3, q3) are the price and demand pairs 
at the three nodes respectively. The generating unit at node 1 
has a capacity of 550 MW, and a constant marginal cost (mc) 
of $10/MWh. The unit at node 2 has a capacity of 1500 MW 
and a constant marginal cost of $8/MWh.  
The values of FTRmax and FTRGENmax as in equations (6) 
and (8) respectively have been assumed uniformly as 2000 
MW for all trades; and similarly FTRmin and FTRGENmin as in 
equations (7) and (9) respectively have been assumed to be 
zero. The FTR bidders expect to get the differences of the 
nodal prices as the maximum value per MW of FTR. The 
solutions to this example under the three cases are given in 
Table I and Table II. 
TABLE I 
EXAMPLE A: PRICES AND PROFITS 
 Case I Case II Case III 
Delivered 
prices 
($/MWh) 
p1 15.0 14.7 15.00 
p2 12.3 12.3 11.5 
p3 15.0 14.7 15.00 
GenCo’s 
profits ($/hr) 
f=1 2362 2408 2344 
f=2 2584 2591 2516 
Total 4946 4999 4860 
Trader’s 
profits ($/hr) 
t=1/FTR 1 0 0 0 
t=2/FTR 2 591 526.9 0 
t=3/FTR 3 0 0 0 
Total 591 526.9 0 
Trading 
profits of 
GenCos ($/hr) 
FTRGEN 1 0 0 0 
FTRGEN 2 0 0 0 
FTR 1** Applicable in Case III only 0 
FTR 2** Applicable in Case III only 141 
FTR 3** Applicable in Case III only 625 
Consumer surplus ($/hr) 2258 2476 2594 
** All the FTRs with traders (in Case I and Case II) are considered to be with 
the cartel of GenCos and traders in Case III. 
 
TABLE II 
EXAMPLE A: DEMAND, GENERATION, TRADE VOLUMES AND POWER FLOWS  
 Case I Case II Case III 
Quantities 
demanded 
(MW) 
q1 625 664 625 
q2 392.42 392 500 
q3 62.5 66 62.5 
Generation by 
GenCos (MW) 
f=1 472.3 513.4 468.7 
f=2 607.6 608.4 718.7 
FTR auctioned 
(MW) 
t=1/FTR 1 0 592.9 0 
t=2/FTR 2 215.2 216.8 0 
t=3/FTR 3 0 0 0 
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FTR 
auctioned to 
GenCos (MW) 
FTRGEN 1 152.7 743.3 653.9 
FTRGEN 2 0 0 0 
FTR 1** Applicable in Case III only 676.1 
FTR 2** Applicable in Case III only 40.2 
FTR 3** Applicable in Case III only 178.5 
Power flows 
(MW) 
flow 1-2 -116.6 -116.8 -118.7 
flow 2-3 98.6 100* 100*
flow 1-3 -36.1 -33.6 -37.5 
* Congested line.  
** All the FTRs with traders (in Case I and Case II) are considered to be with 
the cartel of GenCos and traders in Case III. 
B.  Example B  
In Example B the same three node network is considered. 
In addition, GenCo 1 owns not only the generator at node 1, 
but also a new generator at node 3; Trader 1 bids for an 
additional FTR, FTR 4 from node 2 to node 1, competing with 
Trader 2 that bids along the same corridor. The new generator 
and trade are shown with dotted lines in Fig. 3. 
The demand function at each node remains the same as in 
Example A. The new generator at node 3 has a marginal cost 
of $9/MWh. The maximum value of FTR 4 is 2000 MW. The 
results of the simulations are presented in Table III and Table 
IV. 
1 2 GenCo 1 GenCo 2 Trader 3, FTR3 
3 
Trader 1, FTR1 
Trader 2, FTR2 
GenCo 1 
Trader 1, FTR4 
Genco 1, 
FTRGEN 1 
GenCo 2, FTRGEN 2 
 
Fig. 3. Example B - three node system 
TABLE III 
EXAMPLE B: PRICES AND PROFITS 
 Case I Case II Case III 
Delivered 
prices 
($/MWh) 
p1 14.17 14.17 15.00 
p2 12.23 12.23 11.5 
p3 14.45 14.5 14.5 
GenCo’s 
profits ($/hr) 
f=1 at 1 2173 2170 2069 at 3 372 378 402 
f=2 2557 2555 2474 
total 5102 5103 4945 
Trader’s 
profits ($/hr) 
t=1 FTR 1 0 0 0 FTR 4 189.7 322 0 
t=2/FTR 2 2.670 0 0 
t=3/FTR 3 212.859 80.73 0 
total 405.137 403.65 0 
Trading 
profits of 
GenCos ($/hr) 
FTRGEN 1 0 0 4 
FTRGEN 2 0 0 0 
FTR 1** Applicable in Case III only 0 
FTR 2** Applicable in Case III only 11 
FTR 3** Applicable in Case III only 0 
FTR 4** Applicable in Case III only 711 
Consumer surplus ($/hr) 2865 2864 2626 
** All the FTRs with traders (in Case I and Case II) are considered to be with 
the cartel of GenCos and traders in Case III. 
 
TABLE IV 
EXAMPLE B: DEMAND, GENERATION, TRADE VOLUMES AND POWER FLOWS  
 Case I Case II Case III 
Quantities 
demanded 
(MW) 
q1 728.8 729.2 625 
q2 395.6 395.8 500 
q3 69.4 68.7 68.75 
Generation by 
GenCos (MW) 
f=1 at 1 550 520.8 413.7 at 3 68.4 68.7 73.1 
f=2 551.3 604.2 706.9 
FTR 
auctioned 
(MW) 
t=1 FTR 1 0 0 0 FTR 4 97.8 166.7 0 
t=2/FTR 2 1.2 0 0 
t=3/FTR 3 109.8 41.7 0 
FTR auctioned 
to GenCos 
(MW) 
FTRGEN 1 0 0 8 
FTRGEN 2 0 0 0 
FTR 1** Applicable in Case III only 0 
FTR 2** Applicable in Case III only 3.7 
FTR 3** Applicable in Case III only 0 
FTR 4** Applicable in Case III only 203 
Power flows 
(MW) 
Flow 1-2 -125* -125* -125*
Flow 2-3 83.7 83.3 81.9 
Flow 1-3 -82.5 -83.3 -86.3 
* Congested line.  
** All the FTRs with traders (in Case I and Case II) are considered to be with 
the cartel of GenCos and traders in Case III. 
In Case I of Example A (Table I), it is important to note 
that the prices at nodes differ, although there is no congestion 
in this case (see Table II, last row – power flows). Cournot 
prices differ at various nodes, as pointed out by Hobbs in [1], 
because of the imperfect arbitrage between nodes.  
C.  Discussions  
The results of three cases listed in Tables I-IV are analyzed 
in the following.  
    1)  Impact of FTR auctions to GenCos on consumer surplus 
In Example B, consumer surplus is the highest in Case I 
(Table III). However, in Example A, it is the highest in Case 
III (Table I). It is also noted that possession of FTRs by 
GenCos (denoted by FTRGEN) in Case I and Case II in both 
the examples does not generate any profits for them (se e 
Table I for Example A, Table III for Example B)). However, 
in Case III in both the examples, the cartel formed by the 
collusion of GenCos and traders is able to alter the generation 
profile in a manner such that its overall profit from generation 
assets and FTRs is maximized.  A comparison of Case III with 
the other two cases in Table II and Table IV show that the 
generation is increased at node 2 (cheap node, mc = 
$8/MWh)) and reduced at node 1 (costly node, mc = 
$10/MWh). This is not only because the generation at the 
node 2 is cheaper than node 1, but also because increased 
generation at node 2 helps in reducing the price at that node 
(refer Table I, p2=$11.5/MWh in Case III, as compared to 
$12.3 in other two cases and similarly in Table III) and 
reduced generation at node 1 helps in increasing the price at 
node 1. This helps the cartel of GenCos and traders in Case III 
to maximize the profit from possession of FTRs. Incidentally, 
while in Example A, this helps in increasing consumer surplus 
of Case III (Table I, last row), in Example B, this leads to the 
least consumer surplus in Case III as compared to other cases 
 6
(Table III, last row). Hence, from a policy point of view, it 
may not be prudent to impose a regulation that prevents 
GenCos from possessing transmission rights under all 
conditions of system operation.  
    2)  Impact of spatial diversity of demand elasticity on 
aggregate consumer surplus 
Further, economic regulations are meant to improve 
performance in terms of consumer surplus. “Performance”, 
when measured in terms of consumer surplus, need not 
connote a higher aggregate demand served. This happens 
because of the diversity in the elasticity of demand across 
nodes – the spatial diversity of demand elasticity. As an 
illustration: the total demand served, in Example B is almost 
equal in Case I (1193.8 MW = 728.8+395.6+69.4, column 3, 
row 2, Table IV), Case II (1193.7 MW = 729.2+395.8+68.7, 
column 4, row 2, Table IV) and in Case III (1193.75 MW = 
625+500+68.75, column 5, row 2, Table IV). However, the 
consumer surpluses in Case I and Case II are greater than that 
in Case III (see Table III, last row). Therefore the performance 
measured in terms of aggregate consumer surplus needs to 
take into account the spatial inequities which are innate in 
such measures. This could probably be done by assigning 
weights to the consumer surplus at various nodes – which 
opens up other issues pertaining to development of “optimal” 
weights.  
    3)  Inducement for cartel formation 
In both the examples discussed above, it is observed that 
the ownerships of FTRs generate the highest profit in Case III.  
For example in Table I, the sum of GenCo’s total profit, 
trader’s total profit and trading profit of GenCos equal to 
(4946 + 591=5537) for Case I, (4999 + 526=5525.9) for Case 
II, and (4860 + 141 + 625=5626) for Case III, and similarly in 
Table III. However, all the traders in FTRs and GenCos do not 
gain uniformly from collusion. Hence the cartel may not 
materialize unless some bargaining mechanism ensures 
sharing of benefits between various players based on their 
contribution to the collusion. In other words, if some players 
(traders or GenCos) cause externalities for other players, the 
interested parties can bargain to correct any externality. In the 
small three network example it is probably possible to identify 
and negotiate. In a real power system such a negotiation may 
be costly or even impractical. In Example A, consider Table I, 
the gains and losses of each play by changing from Case II 
(cartel of traders vs. cartel of GenCos) to Case III (cartel of all 
traders and GenCos) are calculated as following. 
• Trader 3 gains $625/hr from FTRs: [column 5, row 16 
(625)] – [column 4, row 10 (0)]; 
• GenCo 1 loses $64/hr: [column 4, row 5 (2408)] – 
[column 5, row 5 (2344)]; 
• GenCo 2 loses $75/hr: [column 4, row 6 (2591)] – 
[column 5, row 6 (2516)]; 
• Trader 2 loses $386/hr: [column 4, row 9 (526.9)] – 
[column 5, row 15 (141)]; 
The total loss of GenCo 1, GenCo 2 and Trader 2 is $525/hr. 
Trader 3 could therefore redistribute its gain among the cartel 
partners and make every player better-off. 
Assuming no transaction cost, this gain could be 
redistributed between the players so that no one loses from the 
collusion. As illustrated in Section III-C.1), such collusion is 
consumer welfare improving in Example A and consumer 
welfare reducing in Example B. Hence under this condition 
the regulator needs a market oversight to contain such 
transactions only if they result in the reduction of consumer 
surplus.  
This discussion underscores that regulations restricting the 
GenCos from purchasing FTRs may not induce efficiency 
under all conditions of the ownership patterns and demand 
conditions. Further, the regulator may not be able to observe 
tacit collusion between players, thereby calling the 
effectiveness of such regulations into question.  
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
The paper models the interaction between an imperfectly 
competitive traders’ market and an imperfectly competitive 
GenCos’ market conjecture assumption. The results of the 
models have implications for policy planners and regulators 
on the choices of market structures and design of regulatory 
mechanisms. The implications are that the possession of FTRs 
by GenCos may be welfare enhancing under certain 
conditions and hence regulations prohibiting GenCos from 
possessing FTRs could in fact reduce welfare.  
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